Section 306 CrPC: Tender of pardon to accomplice

Chapter XXIV

accomplice evidence, approver, commitment for trial, custody of approver, disclosure of facts, magistrate's power, tender of pardon

New Law Update (2024)

Section 344 BNSS

TRIAL COURT

Court of Session, Court of Special Judge, Chief Judicial Magistrate

Punishment

Imprisonment up to 7 Year(s)

Cognizable?

Bailable?

Compoundable?

Bare Act Text

Section 306: Tender of pardon to accomplice

(1) With a view to obtaining the evidence of any person supposed to have been directly or indirectly concerned in or privy to an offence to which this section applies, the Chief Judicial Magistrate or a Metropolitan Magistrate at any stage of the investigation or inquiry into, or the trial of, the offence, and the Magistrate of the first class inquiring into or trying the offence, at any stage of the inquiry or trial, may tender a pardon to such person on condition of his making a full and true disclosure of the whole of the circumstances within his knowledge relative to the offence and to every other person concerned, whether as principal or abettor, in the commission thereof.

(2) This section applies to—

(a) any offence triable exclusively by the Court of Session or by the Court of a Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952);

(b) any offence punishable with imprisonment which may extend to seven years or with a more severe sentence.

(3) Every Magistrate who tenders a pardon under sub-section (1) shall record—

(a) his reasons for so doing;

(b) whether the tender was or was not accepted by the person to whom it was made,

and shall, on application made by the accused, furnish him with a copy of such record free of cost.

(4) Every person accepting a tender of pardon made under sub-section (1)—

(a) shall be examined as a witness in the Court of the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence and in the subsequent trial, if any;

(b) shall, unless he is already on bail, be detained in custody until the termination of the trial.

(5) Where a person has accepted a tender of pardon made under sub-section (1) and has been examined under sub-section (4), the Magistrate taking cognizance of the offence shall, without making any further inquiry in the case,—

(a) commit it for trial—

(i) to the Court of Session if the offence is triable exclusively by that Court or if the Magistrate taking cognizance is the Chief Judicial Magistrate;

(ii) to a Court of Special Judge appointed under the Criminal Law Amendment Act, 1952 (46 of 1952), if the offence is triable exclusively by that Court;

(b) in any other case, make over the case to the Chief Judicial Magistrate who shall try the case himself.

Important Sub-Sections Explained

Section 306(1)

This sub-section empowers specific Magistrates (Chief Judicial Magistrate, Metropolitan Magistrate, or Magistrate of the first class) to tender a pardon to an accomplice at various stages of an investigation, inquiry, or trial. The core condition for such a pardon is that the accomplice makes a full and true disclosure of all relevant circumstances concerning the offence and other involved persons.

Section 306(4)

This sub-section outlines the obligations of an accomplice who accepts a tender of pardon. They must be examined as a witness in the Magistrate’s Court and subsequent trial, and unless already on bail, must be kept in custody until the trial concludes, ensuring their availability and preventing tampering.

Landmark Judgements

Lt. Commander Pascal Fernandes v. State of Maharashtra (1968):

The Supreme Court held that the power to tender pardon is discretionary and its exercise depends on the Magistrate’s satisfaction that such pardon is essential for obtaining true evidence. The conditions for pardon, especially ‘full and true disclosure’, are paramount.

Sarwan Singh v. State of Punjab (1957):

This landmark case established the principle that the evidence of an approver (accomplice who has accepted pardon) must be corroborated in material particulars not only with respect to the crime but also with respect to the accused to whom it relates, as approver’s evidence is inherently weak and susceptible to manipulation.

Balakrishna Savalram Pujari v. State of Mysore (1958):

The Supreme Court reiterated the need for independent corroboration of an approver’s statement and clarified the Magistrate’s role in ensuring that the pardon is tendered under the specified conditions to elicit truthful testimony.

Chapter XXIV